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 The growing need to protect global shipping routes and the intensification of maritime territorial conflicts have led to a naval arms buildup around 
the world�1 Perhaps the most-cited example of this new focus on naval power is 
the increasing number of countries building or planning new aircraft carriers, 
but many analysts are more concerned about the proliferation of modern attack 
submarines�2 Often considered the ultimate weapon of naval warfare, submarines 
are versatile platforms able to attack surface ships, conduct antisubmarine war-
fare (ASW), deploy mines, and, as they are increasingly equipped with missiles, 
attack land targets�3 In addition, submarines are also highly capable intelligence-
gathering platforms, able to monitor ship movements over vast distances, cut 
undersea communications cables, and insert reconnaissance teams covertly on 
hostile shores�4 Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control, 
they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one� Submarines also create 
uncertainty for an opponent, since the presence of an enemy submarine is dif-
ficult to confirm until an attack takes place� Countering a hostile submarine force 
is not only difficult but also very time consuming�5 Given such strong offensive 
capabilities, submarines are viewed as especially detrimental to crisis stability�6
Nevertheless, despite the rapidly increasing number of countries buying 
submarines and counter to conventional wisdom, I argue that the threat to in-
ternational security from the current submarine proliferation around the world 
may have been exaggerated� In reality, it is very difficult and costly to operate 
submarines safely and even more difficult to create and sustain a submarine force 
capable of conducting effective combat patrols� Furthermore, the strategic value 
of a submarine force in comparison with other defense assets in times of limited 
budgets is not always self-evident, and some longtime operators of submarines 
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have even abandoned them in favor of larger surface vessels�7 In this article I 
analyze the threat to international security from the global proliferation of sub-
marines by focusing on the challenges of maintaining boats and training crews� 
The article consists of three main sections: the first maps the global proliferation 
of submarines; the second analyzes the threat from this proliferation in terms of 
having enough submarines in a fleet, maintaining them, and training and retain-
ing enough personnel; and the third concludes� 
THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF SUBMARINES 
Given submarines’ versatility, many navies around the world are currently pro-
curing or actively contemplating the acquisition of new ones�8 Although the total 
number of submarines in the world has fallen since the height of the Cold War, 
mainly due to the retirement of large numbers of old Soviet and Chinese boats, 
the current global submarine inventory stands at over four hundred submarines 
operated by some forty countries (see the table)�9 Of these some 390 are attack 
submarines or nonstrategic guided-missile submarines� It is estimated that more 
than 150 new submarines will be built by 2021 and that up to three hundred 
could be launched in the next fifteen to twenty years�10 According to industry 
sources, the global submarine market was valued at U�S�$14�4 billion in 2013 and 
is expected to grow to $21�7 billion by 2023�11 Such longtime submarine build-
ers and operators as China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States are all renewing their current fleets�12 The main 
export markets are, however, in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America� In 
these regions, many existing submarines from the Soviet era, as well as early Ger-
man export models, are reaching the ends of their operational lives and need to 
be replaced� In addition, several navies without previous experience with the type 
are ordering submarines�13 National security is a main reason driving the demand 
for submarines in some areas, particularly in Asia, but domestic industrial and 
technological development goals, as well as national prestige, are also important 
factors�14 
The submarine world used to be controlled by the great powers and a handful 
of technologically advanced countries, such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden� Today, in contrast, submarine operators can be found on every in-
habited continent, including Africa�15 In the Middle East, the navies of Algeria, 
Egypt, Iran, and Israel have submarines, while Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates are contemplating acquisitions�16 In Latin America too, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela all have submarines, 
and several of them are in the process of adding to their fleets� In South Asia, 
India and Pakistan have long operated submarines and deployed them in war, 
while Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) are planning to procure submarines 
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in the near future�17 In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are adding new 
submarines to already impressive fleets to counter China’s and North Korea’s 
very large submarine forces� In Southeast Asia, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have attack submarines, and many plan new 
acquisitions�18 In addition, the Philippines and Thailand recently announced that 
they too are seeking to obtain submarines�19 Given that many of these countries 
are parties to territorial disputes and close to some of the world’s busiest shipping 
lanes and maritime choke points, it is not surprising that the proliferating num-
ber of submarines around the world has many observers concerned�20
There are not only more submarine operators than ever, but many of the 
boats they operate are also more sophisticated than ever�21 India recently joined, 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the nuclear-
powered-submarine club�22 Brazil may soon join too, as it has plans to build a 
nuclear-powered submarine in the coming decade�23 While it does not enable 
submarines to match the underwater endurance of nuclear-powered boats, the 
increasing availability of air-independent propulsion (AIP) allows conventionally 
powered submarines to remain submerged for weeks rather than days�24 Subma-
rine manufacturers in France, Germany, and Sweden all offer this technology 
to prospective buyers around the world�25 China may soon be added to this list; 
it is rumored that it may sell AIP-equipped submarines to Pakistan, though no 
technical specifications have yet been confirmed�26 Another advanced technology 
increasingly being offered to global submarine customers by France, Russia, and 
the United States is that of submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles� Among 
recent buyers of cruise missiles for submarines are China, Egypt, India, Israel, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam�27 These new technolo-
gies, in combination with more sophisticated sensors, combat systems, and tor-
pedoes, make today’s submarines more capable and versatile than ever� 
ANALYZING THE SUBMARINE THREAT 
Reflecting the proliferation of submarines, the literature on the global naval arms 
buildup is dominated by descriptive accounts of the latest submarines acquisi-
tions and procurement plans of navies around the world� These accounts are 
important indicators of armament trends but primarily focus on technical speci-
fications of boats and details of their weapons systems�28 Counting submarines is 
easy� It is far more difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a submarine force; rising 
numbers alone do not necessarily equate to a rising threat� In fact, few serious at-
tempts are made to evaluate actual status or combat capabilities of the many sub-
marine operators around the world�29 Even in the large literature on the Chinese 
submarine program, most studies focus on equipment and overall strategy, rather 
Continued on page 17
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Country Region SSBN SSGN SSN SSG SSK/SS
Canada North America  4
United States North America 14 4 53
France Europe  4  6
Germany Europe  4
Greece Europe  8
Italy Europe  6
Netherlands Europe  4
Norway Europe  6
Poland Europe  5
Portugal Europe  2
Spain Europe  3
Sweden Europe  5
Turkey Europe 14
Ukraine Europe  1
United Kingdom Europe  4  7
Russia Russia 11 8 17 20
Australia Asia  6
China Asia  4  5  1 60
India Asia  1 13
Indonesia Asia  2
Japan Asia 18
North Korea Asia 20
South Korea Asia 12
Malaysia Asia  2
Pakistan Asia  5
Singapore Asia  6
Taiwan Asia  4
Vietnam Asia  2
Algeria Middle East / North Africa  4
Egypt Middle East / North Africa  4
Iran Middle East / North Africa  3
Israel Middle East / North Africa  3
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than analyzing capability in terms of readiness of boats and training of crews�30 
These omissions lead to problems in correct assessment of the threat from the 
growing submarine forces around the world� 
To deploy a submarine force effectively requires not only boats but the tech-
nical skills necessary to service and maintain them and enough trained person-
nel to operate them� Moreover, an effective submarine force requires means to 
communicate with boats and ability to control them once they deploy� These 
requirements are hard to fulfill and are far more complex than their application 
to surface ships�31 
Minimum Numbers
An effective submarine force requires some minimum number of submarines� 
Because of the heavy maintenance requirements of submarines, it is generally 
held that at least four are necessary to keep one or two continuously on station or 
available for deployment�32 A smaller fleet will not provide enough opportunities 
for crew training, regular patrol deployments, or maintenance to sustain a capa-
bility over time� However, many of the world’s submarine forces are very small, 
over a quarter smaller than that threshold size� Of the forty-two current opera-
tors, thirteen (see table) have fewer than four submarines (not counting coastal 
or midget submarines): Argentina (three), Ecuador (two), Indonesia (two), Iran 
(three), Israel (three), Libya (two), Malaysia (two), Portugal (two), South Af-
rica (three), Spain (three), Ukraine (one), Venezuela (two), and Vietnam (two)� 
Moreover, the submarines in several of these small forces are very old, reaching 
Country Region SSBN SSGN SSN SSG SSK/SS
Libya Middle East / North Africa  2
Argentina Latin America / Caribbean  3
Brazil Latin America / Caribbean  5
Chile Latin America / Caribbean  4
Colombia Latin America / Caribbean  4
Ecuador Latin America / Caribbean  2
Peru Latin America / Caribbean  6
Venezuela Latin America / Caribbean  2
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa  3
Total 37 12 89 1 277
Grand Total: 416 
Sources: The Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014); U.S. Navy; “Submarine Proliferation Resource Collection,” NTI, 
21 October 2013, www.nti.org/.
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the ends of their safe service lives� Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and 
Venezuela all operate thirty-to-forty-year-old submarines that are increasingly 
“maintenance heavy” and limited in their ability to go to sea� In a small fleet, this 
fact even further restricts opportunities for necessary crew training and patrol 
deployments� Some of these countries have recently ordered new submarines 
but in most cases will only replace existing boats without significantly increasing 
numbers� Some other submarine forces have four or more submarines but only 
on paper; in reality, many of their submarines are very old and in extended or 
even indefinite maintenance, seriously impacting the training and deployment 
of the remaining units� 
Maintenance and Logistics
Owing to their taxing underwater environment, submarines are particularly 
challenging to keep operational� This is especially the case in the tropics, where 
higher salinity and temperature of seawater increase corrosion on equipment 
that in many cases was designed for much colder and less corrosive northern cli-
mates�33 Modern submarines are complex systems of systems, requiring substan-
tial skills in not only regular ship maintenance but also the upkeep of advanced 
propulsion and technology employed in acoustics, electronics, and periscope 
optics�34 The catastrophic consequences of mechanical or equipment failure un-
derwater require particular attention to quality control and regular maintenance� 
By no means all countries are capable of fully servicing and refitting modern 
submarines; many operators are forced to hire foreign help or send their boats 
abroad for extended periods of time and at great cost� Any deferment of regular 
service and refits quickly renders boats unsafe for operations�35 
Maintaining and servicing complex systems like submarines require both 
technical expertise and suitable shipyards� The challenges of maintaining subma-
rines with inadequate support organizations can be illustrated by the experience 
of the South African navy and its German Type 209 submarines, a minor local 
overhaul of one of which commenced in 2007� Inadequate infrastructure and 
technical understanding of onboard electrical systems reportedly kept the boat 
out of commission for more than five years�36 In August 2012, it was reported, 
all three of South Africa’s submarines were in dry dock, the only operational 
vessel having crashed into the seabed�37 The problems of maintenance also in-
crease when there are many different types of boats in a fleet�38 The complexity 
of servicing the Indian submarine fleet—comprising German Type 209, Russian 
Kilo, Russian nuclear-powered Akula II, indigenously designed nuclear-powered 
boats, and soon also French Scorpène—must be daunting, to say the least� In fact, 
a lack of adequate domestic repair facilities and difficulties in obtaining spare 
parts have forced India to send many of its submarines to Russia for lengthy refits 
over the years�39 
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Even long-established, single-class submarine services can have great diffi-
culties in maintaining their boats� The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) currently 
operates six Swedish-designed Collins-class submarines that were coproduced in 
Australia and commissioned between 1996 and 2003� These boats, among the 
largest and most advanced conventional submarines in the world, have suffered 
from persistent maintenance problems that have resulted in reduced availability 
and opportunities for crew training� The RAN’s stated goal is to have always two 
submarines deployed or available for immediate deployment, two in training, 
and two in maintenance� However, this goal has reportedly never been achieved; 
the navy has at times been 
left with only one operational 
submarine, sometimes none 
at all�40 
Many of the problems of 
the Collins-class submarines 
are not design related but stem from a failure by the RAN to make adequate 
maintenance and logistical arrangements when they entered service�41 This early 
lack of attention to maintenance and logistics and subsequent failure to adopt 
processes for reliability control led to maintenance backlogs that greatly reduced 
the number of available submarines for the RAN� Despite improvements, the 
Australian submarine force still has problems with availability, and RAN subma-
rines have reportedly had to withdraw from three recent international exercise 
deployments, among them RIMPAC 2012, because of technical problems�42 The 
failure of the RAN to establish adequate and comprehensive maintenance pro-
cedures for its submarines shows that even experienced operators with access to 
domestic comprehensive shipbuilding industries may have trouble keeping their 
fleets at sea� 
Another case in point is Canada, whose current fleet of four Victoria-class 
submarines, bought secondhand from the United Kingdom, has since the boats’ 
commissioning between 2000 and 2004 suffered ongoing mechanical problems 
and accidents� The Royal Canadian Navy has never had more than two of these 
boats in operational condition, sometimes none�43 Servicing the boats has proved 
not only far more complicated than expected but also far more costly�44 Accord-
ing to defense experts, shortsighted management decisions in the procurement 
process, such as failing to acquire sufficient spare parts or establish supplier 
relationships beforehand, have led to repeated and significant delays in restoring 
submarines to operational status�45 The Canadian submarine fleet is at this writ-
ing expected to reach a steady state for the first time in late 2014, whereby three 
of its four submarines will be available for operations at any one time, on a rolling 
schedule� It will have taken more than a decade to reach this point�46 According 
Counting submarines is easy. It is far more 
difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a sub-
marine force; rising numbers alone do not 
necessarily equate to a rising threat.
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to the Canadian navy, the four Victorias together managed to spend only around 
1,300 days at sea over the ten-year period 2003–13�47
Maintaining submarines is costly� Any submarine force lacking funds for 
maintenance and training will struggle to maintain any useful level of readiness� 
To get Canada’s submarine force fully operational, the nation’s Treasury Board 
approved in 2008 the expenditure of up to Cdn�$1�5 billion over as many as 
fifteen years for the in-service support for the Victoria class� After a competitive 
bidding, the Victoria In-Service Support Contract was awarded to the Canadian 
Submarine Management Group, currently known as Babcock Canada, Inc�48 In 
June 2013 the Canadian government extended the submarine maintenance and 
support contract with Babcock Canada, valued at Cdn�$531 million, for another 
five years�49
Given that submarines are among the most complicated machines in ex-
istence, maintaining them is of central importance� Rigorous and regularly 
scheduled maintenance periods are essential� Failure to include the costs of 
submarine upkeep in defense budgets may therefore be an indication of a low 
level of attention to the issue� As a case in point, in 2011 the Malaysian Ministry 
of Defence was awarded an additional allocation of RM 493�3 million ($167 mil-
lion) to maintain its two recently bought Scorpène submarines, raising the total 
defense budget to RM 11 billion ($3�77 billion)� Apparently the defense ministry 
had not allocated any funds to maintain or administer the submarines in the 
original budget�50 Moreover, owing to the lack of necessary local technical ex-
pertise to service them, the Malaysian navy’s two Scorpènes are now maintained 
by the French company Boustead DCNS Naval Corporation� According to press 
reports, Boustead provides full logistics support to the Malaysian navy—spare 
parts, workshop equipment, yard facilities and equipment, submarine safety 
conditioning facilities, support, and maintenance� The company even provides 
tugboat services and operates and maintains ship lifts, and submarine umbilical 
services (shore electrical power and the like)�51 
Submarine operators that do not have the required expertise or the funds to 
buy it on commercial terms are left to improvise� Iran, for example, has three 
Russian Kilo-class submarines but cannot afford, or does not dare, to send them 
back to Russia for refurbishment and upgrade� Russia refuses to provide neces-
sary technical information and spare parts, so Iran has undertaken upgrades 
at home� Forced to complete refurbishments and repairs to one of its Kilos on 
its own, Iran relaunched it in 2012 after seven years in refit� According to Ira-
nian press releases, replacement parts and components (pumps, compressors, 
engines, sound-absorbent tiles, control surfaces, etc�) were locally produced 
and installed�52 Some were commonly available, but many others were not� It is 
unknown how adequate the Iranian replacement parts have proved, but the fact 
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that it took Iran seven years to refit one submarine indicates how challenging it 
is to keep modern submarines at sea�
Maintenance and repair needs increase with age, as do difficulties in obtaining 
spare parts� Many submarines around the world are over thirty years old, some 
over forty� Both Colombia and Venezuela, for example, have 1970s-era Type 
209s�53 Taiwan’s two World War II–era Guppy-type submarines are even older 
and can be used only for training purposes�54 Indonesia’s two Type 209 boats, 
bought from Germany in 1981, have been repeatedly refitted, but they are not 
to be replaced until 2020, at which time they will be forty years old�55 Given the 
work required to keep such old boats running in tropical climates, their sea time 
must be limited and their safety an issue� Some submarine operators simply have 
run out of money and seem to do little maintenance or none at all� The Argen-
tine navy as a whole is reportedly in disrepair owing to the absence of funds for 
maintenance and training� According to media reports, all three of its submarines 
have defects and barely left port in 2012�56 Given the poor maintenance perfor-
mance of many countries, the operational status of many submarine forces must 
be seriously questioned� 
Training and Deployment 
Operation of a submarine is very different from the case with a surface vessel� 
A submarine without a properly trained crew cannot do much more than sail in 
and out of harbor� Training submarine crews, however, is especially difficult and 
time consuming� To become qualified, a submariner needs between one and two 
years of intensive training; fully mastering some high-technology systems, such 
as advanced sonar, takes even longer�57 It can take at least six years of training 
to make a crew a cohesive unit able to operate at sea effectively�58 A submarine 
captain requires, to reach the highest skill levels, between ten and fifteen years 
of training and deployment� A submarine’s crew, to remain qualified and main-
tain its skills, needs regular deployments� While surface sailors and officers can 
practice many of their skills on any surface vessel, a submarine crew can train 
effectively only on a submarine� Although simulators are becoming increasingly 
powerful, many submarine-related skills cannot be learned or maintained except 
during actual deployments�59 A lack of training boats and shore facilities quickly 
atrophies skills� In navies having only one, two, or a handful of submarines, the 
availability of boats on which to train directly bounds the possibility of achieving 
trained crews and effective deployments� 
In the U�S� Navy, with a large submarine fleet and a high operational tempo, 
submarine crews gain experience and maintain skills from repeated and extended 
deployments� Other highly regarded submarine services are, for example, the 
British, Dutch, German, Japanese, and Swedish� Two common traits among these 
services are focus on maintenance and close relationships with original design 
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firms and building yards, as a result of which their boats can be used effectively 
for training and deployment� For these submarine services, a greater challenge is 
to recruit and retain enough personnel� The shortage of personnel means that, for 
example, British submarines regularly leave for deployments with less than full 
crews; that only three of the Dutch navy’s four submarines can be fully manned; 
and that the Swedish navy would be able to send its five submarines to sea simul-
taneously only by drawing on submarine-qualified personnel assigned to central 
staff and shore duties�60
In fact, many if not most submarine services around the world suffer from 
recruitment problems� South Korea and Taiwan both have difficulty recruiting 
and retaining submariners�61 The Australian navy is so short of submariners that 
it can find crews for only three or four of its six boats and actively seeks recruits 
from overseas�62 The South African navy needs about 150 submarine-qualified 
sailors to form full-time crews for its three boats, but over the last several years it 
has had enough sailors to operate only one� Moreover, owing to high operating 
expenses and a lack of funds, the ships and submarines of the South African navy 
spend a very limited amount of time at sea� On 17 July 2012 the South African 
submarine SAS Queen Modjadji collided with the ocean floor during an exercise 
because of what a member of parliament described as negligence and poor train-
ing�63 Since the other two South African submarines were in long-term mainte-
nance, the crash put the country’s entire submarine fleet in dry dock simulta-
neously, effectively precluding training�64 In Latin America, many submarines 
are in a poor state, resulting in little or no training for crews� According to one 
report, Argentina’s submarine crews spent only nineteen total hours submerged 
in 2011�65 
All submarine services experience incidents and accidents, but with inex-
perienced crews minor incidents are more likely to have fatal consequences� A 
case in point is the Indian navy, where personnel shortages have plagued the 
submarine service since its inception in the 1960s� Rapid introduction in a short 
time of large numbers of submarines from different countries, while simulta-
neously setting up shore support facilities, made recruitment difficult�66 Selec-
tion procedures had to be made less stringent, and pay was increased several 
times� According to naval historians in India, it was only in the 1990s that the 
Indian navy began to attract personnel of the desired caliber to submarines�67 
Even today, despite increases in pay, the Indian submarine service seems to suf-
fer from training and maintenance problems�68 In August 2013, explosions sank 
INS Sindhurakshak (a Russian-built Kilo) in Mumbai Harbor, killing its crew of 
eighteen; the cause, according to preliminary findings, was an accident with or 
mishandling of ammunition by inexperienced crew members in the weapons 
compartment�69 Another possible explanation for the catastrophic explosion is, 
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according to Russian experts, a violation of safety standards and instructions by 
the crew during the recharging of the submarine’s batteries�70 The Sindhurakshak 
disaster and subsequent publicity in Indian media on the harsh living conditions 
on board Russian-built submarines will hardly make future recruitment any 
easier for the Indian submarine service�71 
All established submarine services conduct their own training� Some co-
operate and send students to each other’s schools� The Australian and Cana-
dian navies, for example, both collaborate with Britain and the United States 
in submarine training� Joint submarine training is also common within NATO� 
The British and Dutch ad-
vanced “Perisher” courses 
for prospective submarine 
commanders are increasingly 
open to other friendly nations’ 
submarine communities� Students from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States have all participated in 
these legendary courses�72 
However, navies with little or no previous submarine experience must seek 
training elsewhere� All major exporters of submarines provide some degree of 
training to their customers� There is little available information on such pro-
grams, but they seem to last between six months and four years, depending on 
the nations involved� Sometimes such training is organized by the host navies; 
in other cases the companies building the submarines are in charge� The level of 
training also depends on the quality of crews sent� Two of the biggest purveyors 
of submarine training of this kind are France and Russia� 
Malaysia is the most recent beneficiary of French submarine training� In Janu-
ary 2005, 156 Malaysian sailors began a program in France that included at-sea 
training on a retired French navy Agosta-class submarine� In December 2005, 
twenty-three crew members qualified as submariners, and in January 2009, after 
four years of training, the first Malaysian submarine crew became operational� 
Information on the level of Malaysian submarine training is scant, but it is known 
that the Malaysian navy has long-standing problems recruiting qualified sailors 
and coping with technologically advanced systems�73 In this case, after the Ma-
laysian submarines were brought home, local sea trials were repeatedly delayed, 
owing to technical and maintenance problems� The submarines have reportedly 
been unable at times to conduct basic diving exercises, and they have been criti-
cized for not being deployed�74 Malaysia has since turned to DCI, a French com-
pany, which is participating in the creation and running of a submarine school at 
the Kota Kinabalu base in Malaysia�75 
The threat to international security from the 
current submarine proliferation around the 
world may have been exaggerated.
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Russia is providing training to its many submarine customers in both the 
Baltic Sea and in the Far East� Russian submarine training heavily emphasizes 
classroom teaching and dockside drills�76 Because Russian submarines have 
shorter design life spans than Western boats, Russian-trained crews spend less 
time at sea, to minimize wear and tear on components and equipment� Also, 
foreign officers are apparently given command of their boats after comparatively 
little sea time� The first Vietnamese sailors arrived in Russia in January 2013, 
with no experience with the type, to begin the theoretical part of their submarine 
training�77 Sea training was conducted near Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea, in 
April and May 2013 and included “five 10-days [sic] sea voyages,” according to 
press reports�78 The first boat was officially accepted by the Vietnamese navy on 
15 January 2014, and its crew began to operate it, after some ten total months of 
submarine training�79 
Vietnam lacks a domestic submarine training school; India has offered to 
train Vietnamese sailors at its own� Even with sustained Russian and Indian 
support, however, there are major questions regarding the ability of Vietnam to 
develop a fully functioning submarine force over the coming years�80 Moreover, 
it is far from clear how these submarines will communicate and fit together with 
all the other new ships and aircraft Vietnam is currently acquiring from Russia, 
the Netherlands, Canada, and France� Given the Vietnamese military’s limited 
experience operating each of these platforms even separately, industry analysts 
predict that Vietnam will fall somewhere between Singapore (at the high end) 
and Indonesia (at the low end) in ability to create eventually an effective subma-
rine capability�81 
COMPLICATED AND COSTLY
There is a great concern among many defense analysts that the rapid spread of 
submarines around the world will threaten international crisis stability� More 
countries than ever are fielding submarines, but it is less than clear that the risk 
of conflict and war has increased thereby� In this article I argue that the threat 
from the growing number of submarines around the world may have been over-
stated� At the very least, the available evidence indicates that building up and 
maintaining an effective submarine force are far more complicated and costly 
than is commonly understood� By examining maintenance facilities and logistics 
organizations we learn that many countries are not able to keep their boats safely 
at sea� Having few submarines available, they cannot properly train their crews; 
the costly mistakes and deadly accidents that result leave even fewer boats and 
personnel for actual deployment� 
Accordingly, any assessment of the strategic threat posed by submarine prolif-
eration should focus on the effectiveness of submarine forces’ maintenance and 
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logistics organizations, the quality of their recruitment and training processes 
for crew and commanders, the rates of deployment, and the numbers of patrols 
conducted� Many of the world’s navies are finding it hard to maintain and service 
their submarines properly or even to recruit and retain qualified personnel, and 
these services have little opportunity to conduct enough patrols to give their 
crews the operational experience necessary to deploy effectively� 
However, any evaluation of a submarine threat must also take available anti-
submarine warfare capabilities into account�82 Hunting submarines is difficult 
and time consuming� Even advanced navies find ASW taxing; as the British 
discovered during the Falklands War, locating even an old and poorly operated 
submarine can be a challenge�83 Nevertheless, the very presence of advanced 
ASW capabilities can be expected to have a deterring effect on a hostile subma-
rine force� For example, during the East Timor crisis in late 1999, Indonesia’s two 
submarines shadowed the fleet carrying the Australian-led peacekeeping force 
toward Dili� The presence of Indonesian submarines obliged the force to intensify 
the protection of its sea lines of communications and step up the ASW operations 
of the escort group of frigates, a destroyer, a cruiser, and ASW patrol aircraft�84 
However, once the Indonesian submarines had been detected and their locations 
clearly communicated to the Indonesian authorities the submarines withdrew 
from the area rather than facing the escorting warships�85 (This incident is, of 
course, also a reminder that any maritime force protection ought to include 
advanced ASW capabilities, which means that ASW needs to be maintained and 
further developed as a naval core competency�)86 
While, then, even poorly operated and maintained submarines can never be 
completely discounted as threats to international security, we should neverthe-
less be mindful of the very significant challenges facing many submarine forces 
around the world� The conclusion is therefore that the general threat to inter-
national security from the growing number of submarines appearing in annual 
naval reviews around the world should not be exaggerated; instead, each case 
must be carefully examined� 
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